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Pointing to similarities between challenges encountered in today’s neural coding 
to 20th century behaviorism, we draw attention to lessons learnt from resolving 
the latter. In particular, Perceptual Control Theory posits behavior as a closed-
loop control process with immediate and teleological causes. With two examples, 
we illustrate how these ideas may also address challenges facing current neural 





It is noteworthy that many of the challenges to today’s neural coding paradigms, 
pointed out in Brette (2019), are strikingly similar to problems encountered with 
20th century behaviorism. Other authors have also alluded to this 
correspondence (Gomez-Marin,2017; Fiorillo et al.,2014). Gomez-Marin 
comments that once it became possible to look inside neural tissue, the 
philosophical essence of behaviorism made its way back. Behavior was once 
again relegated to linear responses, but this time to internal causes. According to 
Powers (1973), behavior is control of the animal, by the animal and should be 
studied as a circular process from the perspective of the animal, including both, 
immediate as well as teleological causes. In other words, once one knows the 
‘inside’, would one really know everything on the ‘outside’? The issue seems to 
be with what is meant by causation in these paradigms. Admittedly, both 
behaviorism as well as coding do not consider circular causation, nor do they 
address teleological aspects of causation. Circular causation also features 
prominently in the ‘enactivist’ philosophy of mind, where an organism’s action 
and perception are constantly shaped by mutual interaction with its environment 
(Varela et al.,1991; Verschure et al.,2003). The other problem seems to be the 
way information theory is used. Fiorillo et al. make the case for a shift in 
perspective, where information conditioned on the neuron’s biophysics, rather 
than the experimenter’s knowledge, does away with the need for a ‘neural code’ 
(arguing that encoding/decoding only make sense from the perspective of an 
external observer). These works substantiate Brette’s main argument, claiming 
that the implicit definition of ‘code’ used in neural paradigms does not encompass 
aspects of causation or representation relevant for bridging brain and behavior.   
 
However, there are lessons we can learn from behaviorism. More specifically, 
solutions to those problems might also prove insightful today for addressing 
difficulties encountered in current neuroscience paradigms. In particular, 
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), championed by William Powers (1973) was 
one such response to behaviorism. PCT originated from early cybernetics, which 
was concerned with control and autonomy in living organisms. PCT posits that 
behavior is the process of closed-loop control of what the animal senses, rather 
than a linear causal response to stimuli. The main insight of PCT was that 
autonomous goal-directed behavior necessitates a hierarchical control 
architecture, where higher-level controllers are coupled to lower-level controllers 
such that the output of one layer provides a reference to the next. An organism 
performs actions to cancel the effects of disturbances in what it senses, in order 
to achieve intended perceptual consequences. Reference signals across this 
hierarchy constitute immediate or distal goals. The specification of goals for 
achieving intended consequences constitute purpose. Ultimate purposes are 
assumed to be intrinsic, tied to survival drives.  
 
How does this link to neural coding? The important point is that neural coding 
theories are also trying to explain behavior. However, they attempt to do so by 
anchoring on linear input-output neural mechanisms, akin to a ‘switchboard’ 
model of behavior (Powers). The alternative is that neural activity influences 
actions and actions influence neural activity in terms of what the animal 
perceives. Behavior is thus a circular control process. This solicits an explanation 
of how and why the animal itself controls the ‘switchboard’. If neural coding 
approaches ultimately seek to explain perception and action, then ideas from 
PCT suggest ways to progress beyond metaphors. Namely, PCT calls for a 
process-theoretic view of the brain-body-environment system, where circular 
causation is implemented through hierarchical feedback control.  
 
How does control theory address challenges that neural coding theories face? 
For this, we now turn to control architectures built upon a hierarchy of forward 
models. These offer a viable solution to closed-loop adaptive and anticipatory 
processes. The forward models we refer to are internal models acquired during 
learning and development. These are akin to the physics and psychology 
engines discussed in Lake et al.,2017. Let us point to two specific examples, 
where systems-level control architectures with forward models offer the type of 
closed-loop causal explanations mentioned above. The first example comes from 
cerebellar motor control. Herreros et al.,2016 and Maffei et al.,2017 have 
proposed an anticipatory control scheme involving the vestibular system, where 
the cerebellum implements a forward model of the motor system being 
controlled. The model generates anticipatory adjustments to counteract postural 
and equilibrium disturbances during voluntary movements. It does so by learning 
to anticipate counterfactual errors in motor action given sensory stimuli and an 
internal model of the motor system. This closed-loop control architecture has 
been proposed to model eye-blink conditioning, vestibulo-ocular reflexes and 
visual tracking, all involving cerebellar circuits. Physiologically, this implies that 
timing-dependent plasticity rules of Purkinje cell synapses implement a model of 
the motor system being controlled by that cerebellar microcircuit (Suvrathan et 
al.,2016). Our second example refers to the hierarchical mirror system identified 
in the brain (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009). This extends across several brain 
regions including the motor, somatosensory and gustatory areas. These systems 
have been shown to hierarchically implement internal forward and inverse 
models relating to one’s own sensations. The mirror system projects outputs of 
these self-models upon others during social interactions. This hierarchy of 
forward and inverse models has been used to explain empathy, somatic 
sensations in others and emotions in social cognition (Keysers et al.,2010). Both 
these examples illustrate the role of control and internal models in brain and 
behavior.   
 
In closing, one would agree that encoding or decoding of experimental variables 
in behavioral paradigms are valuable epistemological constructs for the 
experimenter. If ‘goals’ and ‘purposes’ are necessary to describe behavior 
emerging from dynamical systems engaged in hierarchical control (Powers), then 
neuronal coding protocols might be useful tools to identify precisely those 
variables that define the underlying closed-loop dynamical system. However, it is 
also true that one ought to refrain from the fallacy of extending conditional 
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